Ahistorical narratives in a time of science.

[Update: someone at The Atlantic confirmed for me that this was not so much their article, as it was run  “as part of our partnership with the site Defense One.” Defense One is a part of the AtlanticMedia group, which owns both publications. As the science editor for Defense One—where the piece was first published—it isn’t totally clear to me who edited Tucker’s work for content, other than… himself? Transparency and accountability, anyone?]

Patrick Tucker has a piece in The Atlantic titled “The Next Manhattan Project.” It concerns the current dual-use gain-of-function saga—now the so-called deliberative process about biosafety. It is, in short, a piece of ahistorical fiction. Here’s why—or, here is one list of reasons why.

1) “In January 2012, a team of researchers from the Netherlands and the University of Wisconsin published a paper in the journal Science about airborne transmission of H5N1 influenza, or bird flu, in ferrets.”

False. It was two papers: one in Nature by University of Wisconsin-Madision researchers; one in Science by Dutch researchers. When a writer for The Atlantic can’t Google something that happened 3 years ago, you can bet the previous century is going to be a challenge.

2) Eschewing the history behind current events: “[the 2012 paper (should be papers)] changed the way the United States and nations around the world approached manmade biological threats.”

False. The 2011 (it started in 2011, not 2012) controversy was a continuation of a, by then, decade-old debate about what is now called dual-use research of concern. This started in 2001, when a team of Australian researchers published work describing the creation of (in VERY simplistic terms) a super-poxvirus.There was a CIA report, and a NAS committee. Oh, and does anyone remember Amerithrax?

3) “it solved the riddle of how H5N1 became airborne in humans.”

False. Hilariously, the standard defense of the 2012 studies (remember, The Atlantic, plural) is that they don’t show how H5N1 can transmit via aerosolized respiratory droplets. Vincent Racaniello commonly refers to this as “ferrets are not people.” There’s a complexity about animal models that doesn’t lend to those kinds of easy conclusions. It wasn’t the end result of these papers (or the papers that followed), and it certainly wasn’t the intent of the researchers.

4) Eschewing the reasons behind the Manhattan Project.

The Manhattan Project has a complex history. A group of independent, politically minded—largely emigre—scientists; a world on the edge of war; a novel and particular scientific discovery with a potentially catastrophic outcome; and a belligerent power (well, powers—the Japanese and Russians had programs, in addition to the Nazis) the scientists had good reason to suspect was pursuing said technology.

The 2012 story has almost no parallel with these contexts—much less has an organizational, clearly defined set of ends, or unilateral mandate with which to achieve those ends. The existential threat in the background of the Manhattan Project is absent here—there is no Nazi power. If we truly considered H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza to be an existential threat, our public health systems and scientific endeavors would look totally different.

5) Misrepresenting the classified complex.

Despite it being the single comparison Tucker draws between the 2012 studies (plural) and the Manhattan Project, Tucker doesn’t discuss the classified complex as any more than a passing comment. He boils the entire conversation down to “but now the Internet makes classifying things hard.”

Never mind that the classified community was remarkably successful at its job, to the point where it invented ways to create information sharing within an environment of total secrecy. The classified community continues to do its work today—just because we don’t pay much attention to Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, or Lawrence Livermore don’t mean they don’t exist.

Tucker also misses some of the human factors that would actually make his claims interesting. Between Fuchs and the Rosenbergs, ye olde security could be compromised in much the same way as it is today: too much trust of the wrong people, and a bit of carelessness inside the confines of a community that thinks itself insulated. If anything, the current debate about dual-use is more about misplaced trust and overconfidence than it is about nukes.

***

These are only five of a variety of problems with Tucker’s article. What bothers me most is that the headline grants a legitimacy to one perspective on the current debate that simply isn’t warranted. These scientists aren’t racing against the clock to avert a catastrophe—and if they are, their methods are questionable at best. The current debate is far more nuanced, and far less certain than the conversation that went down in Long Island in 1939. And that’s saying something, because the debate then was pretty damned nuanced.

What would the Next Manhattan Project really look like? Lock the best minds in biology in a series of laboratories across the country—or world, that’s cool too. Give them at least $26 billion. And give them charge of creating a cheap, easily deployable, universal flu vaccine.

That’d be great. Or, at least, it’d be much better than The Atlantic’s piece from yesterday.

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